Electricity or Green Money?
Why some environmental groups hamper clean energy
Timothy Schoechle, PhD
• Why do some large environmental organizations collaborate with fossil fuel industries to obstruct, mislead and divert efforts to revamp our energy economy?
• Do the significant annual capital needs of these organizations limit their independence and thus their ability to achieve meaningful environmental goals?
• To what degree have these organizations lost sight of their missions, and thus lost their legitimacy as representatives of the people?
• Should local communities provide “checks” on Big Environmentalism by taking more control of their own energy future to assure sustainability?
• Are well-known “clean energy” investors interested in clean energy—or merely in green money and the “greenwashing” of their investments?
It seems that every day we are confronted with the ever more obvious and damaging effects of human-induced climate change. Why do some of our largest environmental organizations then increasingly collaborate with the fossil fuel industries to obstruct, mislead, or divert efforts to revamp our energy economy? Some of the biggest environmental groups are doing exactly that. They seem to be taking on the growing role of “Judas goat” for the oil and gas and electricity industries by misleading other environmentalists into compromises or concessions. Why is this happening? What are the implications?
This article examines two of the three largest environmental organizations, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and offers specific cases where they appear to have lost their way and are failing us when we need them most. These cases show the pitfalls of the compromises and accommodations that many environmentalists have made in order to raise money and support their organizational growth as well as their political and other goals. They also show that true leadership and change can only spring from the people and not from governments and entrenched institutions.
The case below of the EDF looks at its vigorous advocacy of “smart meters”, devices that have been shown to have dubious energy merits and serious environmental, privacy, and public policy drawbacks. The promotion of smart meters has diverted massive financial resources in directions tangential to the goals of a truly intelligent electricity grid and integration of community-based clean energy, and has fed public cynicism about the “smart grid”—the last thing one would expect a leading environmental organization to do. The case also looks at EDF’s role in fostering the deceptive siren call of the supposedly “green” energy investment mirage by venture capitalists, financiers, and government.
The case of the NRDC shows how it has also assumed a policy role adverse to the recent growth of local rooftop solar “distributed generation” (DG). Instead, NRDC has aligned itself with utility industry interests and their political allies tied to the fossil fuel industry, and with their counterproductive assault on net metering, “value-of-solar” tariffs, and other needed reforms of electric utilities.
Americans need to look carefully at environmentalism today to make certain those in leadership positions in this field are reflecting their values, and are, in fact, achieving the desired goals.
The tilted debate—smart meters
A special Wall Street Journal report on energy posed the question, “Should consumers participate in their utility’s smart-meter program?” to frame a debate between smart meter supporter Jim Marston of the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), and Joshua Hart of StopSmartMeters.org (WSJ, 2013). Hart raised potential radiation and health issues, but Marston argued that the environmental benefits of the meters outweigh any such risk. Marston claimed that the smart meters can “…reduce energy demand and spur the adoption of clean, low-carbon energy resources such as wind and solar power by managing demand and generation more efficiently.” He added “…by enabling two-way, real-time communications, smart meters can give customers the information they need to control their own energy use and reduce their electricity costs.”
Do Marston’s claims have a basis, and if not, why would he and other environmental organizations promote such a technology? Could the rush to deploy smart meters by government and utilities and the resulting public pushback against them reflect a broader dysfunction in energy policy and a “smart grid” that should be adapting to more renewable energy and dealing with climate change?
In reality, none of Marston’s claims are supportable and are either greatly exaggerated or simply false. Unfortunately, Hart, like many others outside the utility industry, did not have sufficient utility industry technical background to challenge these claims and could only argue against the meters on the narrowly defined basis of the health effects of the electromagnetic radiation.1 Otherwise, he could have most certainly asserted even stronger arguments dealing with privacy and security risks, with costs, and with wasted opportunity, and with the technical shortcomings—the simple fact that the meters could never do what Marston was claiming.2 The meter networks squander vast sums of taxpayer, ratepayer and investor money, create enormous risks to personal privacy and security, introduce known and still unknown possible risks to public health, divert human and financial resources, and sour the public on the true promise and opportunity of a truly smarter grid.
Marston’s ambitious and laudatory claims might rightly be attributed to “smart grid” technologies, most of which have not yet been developed, but in no way do they apply to smart meters. Marston, like many in the utility, metering, and “big data analytics” industries—as well as many opponents, like Hart—deftly conflates and confuses smart meters with a “smart grid” that can actually balance electricity supply and demand and enable more renewable energy.
The EDF was formed in about 1967, and traces its origins to local activism in New York and litigation in opposition to environmental harm from the pesticide DDT. Today, it has an annual budget of about $120 million and lists offices in 9 U.S. cities, and in China and Mexico. Its mission has morphed largely toward lobbying, technical analysis, and “designing market-based solutions” largely through “corporate partnerships.”
Among environmental organizations, EDF has been a particularly vigorous advocate of smart meters through offering media articles, regulatory testimony, white papers, guest editorials,3 and project sponsorships.4 EDF President Fred Krupp, in a response to smart meter opponents, stated that EDF was committed to help utilities find ways to
• reduce overall and peak demand;
• eliminate huge waste in the system; and
• enable significantly greater use of clean, renewable energy, non-polluting electric vehicles, and community-based resources. (Krupp, 2011)
Krupp further asserted that “smart meters were key to realizing these benefits because they allow for two-way real-time communication that gives households and utilities the data they need to cut usage and costs”.Krupp’s bullet list is consistent with EDF’s environmental goals, and these are certainly goals of the smart grid. But unfortunately, Krupp’s bullet items are misleading, having nothing to do with smart meters. Unfortunately he is mistaken about their communication capabilities and the benefits of their data. Krupp is paid approximately $485,000, and one would expect him to have access to the technical resources to understand the limitations of smart meters, in spite of all the industry hype and promotion. Why then does EDF not see this juggernaut for what it is—or at least get an independent technical analysis? A possible answer is EDF’s need for alignment with powerful industry economic interests in the hope of gaining some quid pro quo, legitimacy, acceptance, funding, or something else. To find an answer, it may be helpful to step back and look at a little history of the environmental movement, and of EDF.
In The Critics section of the April 15, 2013 issue of The New Yorker, Nicholas Lemann reviewed Adam Rome’s new book The Genius of Earth Day: How a 1970 Teach-in Unexpectedly Made the First Green Generation. Lemann noted “In Rome’s view, the original Earth Day remains a model of effective political organizing” (Lemann, 2013, p. 74). He added that Rome contrasts that 1970 Earth Day with the 1990 Earth Day. Although the later event drew 200,000 to the Washington Mall—far larger than in 1970—it “had far fewer lasting effects”. As Lemann described the situation, in 1970
…most active members of environmental groups were hunters and fishermen. The Sierra Club was an actual club that required new members to be proposed by old ones. The Environmental Defense Fund was two years old. Things like bottle recycling and organic food were exotic. Earth Day’s success was partly a matter of timing: it took place at the moment when years of slowly building environmental awareness were coming to a head, and when the energy of the sixties was ready to be directed somewhere besides the Vietnam War and the civil-rights movement. A coterie of celebrated environmental prophets—Rachel Carson, David Brower, Barry Commoner, Paul Ehrlich—had already established themselves…[and] a suburbanizing, middle-class nation was increasingly aware of the outdoors and prepared to define liberalism in more than purely economic terms.
Earth Day had consequences: it led to the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Clean Water Act of 1972, and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and to the creation, just eight months after the event, of the Environmental Protection Agency. Throughout the nineteen-seventies, mostly during the Republican Administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, Congress passed one environmental bill after another (Lemann, 2013, p. 73).
Lemann then observed that over time, “even as the environmental movement has become an established presence in Washington, it has become less able to win legislative victories” (p. 74). Rome recounted the story of the EDF as an illustrative example. Over that time, the EDF, a “raggedy group of amateur activists on Long Island, whose motto was “sue the bastards,” morphed into something much different. EDF had had many early successes. However,
By the mid-eighties, though, it had become moribund, and a new president, Fred Krupp, then thirty years old, advocated an accommodationist direction for the movement, focused on dealmaking with big business and with Republicans. In the summer of 2006, Krupp and a few allies began assembling a coalition that met regularly at the offices of a professional mediation firm in Washington. He persuaded a number of major corporations with heavy carbon footprints, like Duke Energy, BP, and General Electric, to join. The coalition became an official organization called the U.S. Climate Action Partnership, funded primarily by a handful of major philanthropists and foundations. Shortly before President Obama’s Inauguration, USCAP released the fruit of its labors: a draft of the ill-fated carbon-emissions bill (p. 74).
The community and the smart meter
In failing to understand, or ignoring the grassroots public pushback against smart meters, Krupp, Marston, and their EDF, as well as the NRDC, have again lost touch with their public and its concerns. The rebellion against smart meters,6 having spread to many states as well as to Canada, Australia, Europe, and the UK, may be really only one symptom of a broadly dysfunctional, entrenched, institutionalized, and polluting electricity and energy economy that EDF and NRDC are abetting. The shortcomings and failures of state and federal electricity policy exemplified by the preoccupation with smart meter has been extensively documented (Schoechle, 2012).
As the environmental movement has become institutionalized, it has developed an alliance not only with business interests but also with related venture capital, investment, and financial interests. Instructive examples can be found in regard to the legendary silicon valley venture capital firm, Kleiner Perkins Caulfield & Byers, and its “green-tech” investment initiatives. These examples described below include key Kleiner partner John Doerr, another partner and presumed environmentalist Al Gore, the EDF, interwoven boards, conflicts of interest, financial leverage, political influence, and exploitation of federal grants and loan guarantees.
Author and writer for The Atlantic, Alexis Madrigal gives a celebratory account of a March 2007 TED talk,7 “John Doerr Sees Salvation and Profit in Greentech,” in which John Doerr claims his personal epiphany about his obligation to his daughter’s generation to “…fix global warming through innovation and infrastructure on a massive scale; stopping power plants from being built…New ones—clean ones—would have to be built.” (Madrigal, 2011, p. 10) Madrigal proclaimed that Doerr’s TED talk (Doerr, 2007) heralded the opening of a new era of environmental action whereby capitalists, business, and industry will step in to bring real traction, augmenting and fulfilling the environmentalist’s decades-long struggle. But, recent history suggests that as these two groups, environmentalists and financiers, have connected, it may not have worked quite the way that Madrigal envisioned.
In December of 2007, at the initial U.S. Department of Energy(DoE) sponsored smart grid technical conference in Albuquerque, Grid-Interop 2007 8, Kleiner Perkins’ partner David Wells spoke about how his firm had embraced the future with its new green-tech investment strategy and was solicitous of new technical business opportunities in the smart grid space. He emphasized how committed he and his firm were to re-shaping the electricity grid and the energy economy. But, what has actually transpired has fallen far short of supporting clean energy.
Silver Spring Networks
One of Kleiner’s investments was Silver Spring Networks, a startup manufacturer of specialized wireless smart meter networks for the utility industry, becoming one of the principal drivers of the ill-conceived smart meter network business boom driven by federal stimulus funding. Al Gore, teaming up with Doerr and Kleiner, became a major Silver Spring investor. The fledgling firm benefitted from a share of the $2 billion in matching stimulus funding provided to utilities for smart meter programs.9 Kleiner partners and Gore donated some $2 million to 2008 political campaigns—mostly to Democrats (Stassel, 2013). Ann Doerr, wife of John Doerr, is a member of the EDF board—a red flag for a potential conflict of interest that may explain some of EDF’s empathy with the smart meter business.
John Doerr’s trail of ill-advised environmental investments continues. His firm, Kleiner, was an investor in Fisker Automotive, a failed luxury electric car venture. The Wall Street Journal reported that Doerr and Gore helped push Fisker to get the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) to put up a $529 million loan guarantee to attract more investors and lever their own investments, valuing the company at $1.8 billion (Chernova, 2013). Initially Fisker wanted to start small, asking for a $169 million loan, but in 2009 the DoE asked it to think big and to utilize a shuttered General Motors assembly plant in Wilmington, Delaware. Fisker is now broke and out of business.
Doerr also tied Fisker into another Kleiner deal, battery maker A123 that went broke last year in part because of its dependency on Fisker as a customer, as well as because of its own market miscalculations and quality problems. Perhaps better known was another Kleiner deal, Solyndra, the solar panel maker that suffered technical and pricing problems and went broke leaving the DoE with half a billion in loan guarantees—and much political grief.
Street Journal also
carried an op ed piece by Kimberly
Strassel, “Nearly Sideswiped by another Green Car” (Strassel, 2013)
in detail how Doerr exerted strong political influence and came close
getting DoE to put up another $320 million loan guarantee for
a Kleiner investment,
Next AutoWorks, another luxury electric car maker that has since gone
characterized by Stassel, the email record provided to a House
shows “…how well-connected benefactors used their political pull to go
around credit officials and try to drive the
process ‘top down.’ This is called ‘politics,’ and it underlines the
government moonlighting as an investor.” Ironically, Doerr was given a
slot on President
Obama’s Jobs Council, while at the same time Silver Spring was killing
jobs with its smart meter network
recurring pattern has emerged. An
exclusive club of supposedly “green” investors get the government to
put up big
money to lever their self-serving “green” technology ideas. These deals
all the oxygen and the smaller, possibly more promising,
projects don’t get funded. Marston and Krupp
seem to be insiders in this club, pushing ill-considered “green” ideas
smart meters so that their cohorts, like Doerr and Gore, can benefit.
Some might argue that the above ventures were visionary and, if successful, could have been environmentally beneficial—although even this claim could not be made in the case of Silver Spring Networks. A response might be that they were so highly speculative, technically dubious, disproportionately large, and financially interdependent that the investors and the government should have known better. It is more likely that they were more about financial leverage, political influence, cronyism, faddishness, hype, and exploiting gullibility around the green-tech “goldmine.”
II. The case of the NRDC—stumbling into the solar debate
NDRC, a long-standing respected
national environmental advocacy organization, recently stepped into the
over electricity regulatory policy—and rooftop solar. Unfortunately
to have stepped in on the wrong side. It is enlightening to look at the
issues involved and
at the strange bedfellows that NRDC
has now embraced, including the fossil fuel industry, the utility
the extreme conservative corporate-interest lobbying group, the
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) funded by the Koch brothers.
The NRDC tradition
The NRDC, much like the EDF, was founded in 1970 by a group of activist law students and attorneys motivated by local environmental issues in New York. Today, it has grown to 1.4 million members, a staff of 400 lawyers, scientists, and policy experts, and established offices in Washington DC, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Beijing. Like the EDF and other environmental movements, it has morphed over the years from grassroots political action to professional lobbying with an annual budget of over $100 million. It has undertaken some major environmental litigation and argued several cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. Its website identifies key issues of concern including some closely related to electricity policy—climate change and global warming, clean renewable energy, sustainable communities, water and air pollution, etc.
With this history and array of concerns, it seems strange for the NRDC to step into the electricity policy debate in the manner it did recently with an NRDC-EEI Joint Statement, and to position itself against the growth of distributed solar—endorsing such deeply flawed utility regulatory policies as cost-based tariffs, capital asset recovery, and the utility investments in smart meters with their grossly misrepresented benefits.
NRDC joins the
solar policy debate—on the side of the utility industry!
The Joint Statement to Utility Regulators (NRDC, 2014) mentioned above was issued by the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and the NDRC on February 12, 2014. It is an artfully crafted justification for maintaining and shielding private investor-owned utility (IOU) monopoly profits—in the face of the dramatic challenges abruptly confronting the electric power system posed by the popularity among homeowners of distributed renewable energy—particularly rooftop solar. Directed at state regulators, the two and a half-page Joint Statement justifies obsolete and damaging regulatory policies with arguments embracing and supporting IOU opposition to rooftop solar —while cloaked in rhetoric of “fairness” and of the “reasonable” recovery of non-fuel costs of operating the grid.
EEI and Arizona
Public Service—the context and the stakes
In order to more
fully understand the Joint Statement that NRDC has
on to, it is necessary to see it in the light of two other key papers
its intervention comments in an Arizona regulatory rulemaking, Value
Cost of Distributed Generation (Comer, 2014), and the Disruptive
Challenges report (Kind, 2013) mentioned above. The
unusual intervention by EEI before the Arizona Corporation Commission
the electric utility regulator in Arizona—followed the Joint
only two days. The Disruptive Challenges report
by a year.
So, what was the
issue in Arizona (also in California, Colorado, and a growing list of
and what was EEI pressing for? The issue was “net metering” rules (also
as “distributed generation” or DG) that allow home operators of
systems to feed excess solar power back into the electricity grid and
essentially “run their meters backwards.” In late 2013, Arizona Public
(APS), the local IOU, had proposed charging customers who install
panels an additional $50-100 fee on their monthly bills. After
with public demonstrations, and millions of dollars spent by the
industry to lobby the Arizona regulators and influence public opinion,
essentially lost. Although the
approve a “connection fee,” it was only a tenth of what APS wanted—a
charge of about $5 per
month on a typical household installation (Sweet, 2013) .
Clash between the
old and the new
A reading of the
EEI intervention comments reveals the underlying issue—a clash between
method of monopoly “cost-of-service” (CoS) rate regulation and the
public desire for clean energy and the new concept of “value-of-solar”
utility rates. The traditional CoS model guarantees IOUs full recovery
of delivering electricity plus a significant guaranteed profit,
how it is produced. But when the customers start producing power on
roofs, this model doesn’t work anymore. If too many customers do it,
the IOU no
longer sells enough electricity to cover its fixed costs and costs of
to others, or to meet its investor’s expectations.
Such was the basic
thrust of the EEI Disruptive Challenges report—that
the basic business
model of the utility industry was going to change. The prescient
set the stage for the current debate. It offered the electricity
“heads-up” that their basic business model was threatened by
distributed renewable energy—the “rooftop revolution” that is well
countries like Germany—and it recommended that they rethink their
and prepare for change and disruption.
But, the IOUs and
the EEI Arizona intervention comments argue that the solar customers
a “free ride” because the non-solar customers will have to pay higher
The solar customers argue that they are helping support the grid with
energy and they ask that the true value be recognized. They argue that
environmental benefits to society—including the externalized costs of
pollution, public health, avoided costs of infrastructure, etc.—should
into the rates so that solar customer-producers have their value
NRDC sides with the IOUs, EEI, and ALEC
“the traditional approach to regulation” because, “…costs are readily observable whereas “value” of service propositions are inherently uncertain and speculative and tend to lead to much greater uncertainty” (Comer, 2014, p. 3). This narrowness seem to loose all touch with the original fundamental rationale of monopoly regulation dating back to 1907—guaranteed profits in return for serving the public interest. Why would NRDC embrace such an ironic position?
…this new attack on clean energy policies could benefit members of ALEC who have an interest in coal and other fossil fuels. In the latest attempt to rollback pro-clean energy policies, fossil fuel and utility interests operating through the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) are proposing new model legislation to slow the rise of the clean energy industry by weakening net metering policies. ALEC released the new model language on their website prior to the group's “States and Nation Policy Summit” scheduled for early December. If passed, the “Updating Net Metering Policies Resolution” would be sent to nearly 2,000 state legislator members of ALEC around the country (Elsner, 2014).
Many details of
the strategic ALEC energy assault that was laid out at their 2013
are provided in a memorandum to members of its Energy, Environment and
Agriculture task force offering draft resolutions and model legislation
topics as opposition to EPA greenhouse gas
regulation, net metering, fracking regulation, and limitations on
and gas exploration (ALEC, 2013). Basically, the ALEC assault on net
would protect the profits of fossil fuel industries and the IOUs by
financial incentives for homeowners and others to
install solar power.
An indication of internal NRDC conflict and irony can be sensed in a blog post by Nathanael Greene, Director of the NRDC Renewable Energy Policy Program, titled “Attacks on Solar Should be Rejected. Period.” (Greene, 2014). His post decries the “red-herring attacks” on net metering and the role of ALEC, and he vigorously professes renewed commitment to clean energy, distributed generation, and re-shaping the industry. Then, ironically, from the other side of his mouth, he praises the EEI/NRDC Joint Statement, to be issued the very next day, as a “milestone against which we can judge whether EEI is serious about being part of better, cleaner energy future.”
When environmentalists lose contact with their power-base, they become stuck in a symbiotic relationship where they are dependent on shared interests with their adversaries. When that happens, compromise and accommodation lead progressively toward weakness and failure. Citing Harvard political scientist Theda Skopol, an expert on political movements, Lemann wrote,
Skopol dismisses the notion that climate-change legislation failed because Obama and Harry Reid were not sufficiently committed to it. …the forces behind the climate-change bill directed their money chiefly to the inside game in Washington, and secondarily to “messaging,” rather than to organizing (Lemann, 2013, p. 76).
a community basis of political
power, the environmental organization can lapse into the role of
selling their “legitimacy”
by signing on to or “blessing” polluting, heavily compromised, or
counterproductive corporate or government projects—similar to the
church practice of selling “indulgences” to sinners.
They can also come to serve as industry’s “Judas goat” leading the
environmentalists into the “slaughter” of compromise and capitulation.
of dependency relationship also accounts for the phenomenon of
capture” whereby regulators (e.g., state Public
Utility Commissions) tend over time to serve the interests of the
regulate, or their own interests, rather than the interests of the
grassroots rebellion against smart
meters is indeed taking place and although it may have originated by
over unnecessary radiation, it may be symptomatic of a much larger
example, the personal data privacy issues around meters have only begun
recognized and could grow dramatically in the context of emerging
about a growing “security state” and flagrant government and corporate
and lying. Taken together with local citizen concern over
and gas fracking,11 and the desire for clean
energy sources, the
small rebellion is beginning to morph into a bottom-up, community-based
in electricity and energy that could re-shape society—from a
fuel based economy to one that is decentralized, democratized, and
We have the necessary ingredients for change,
including the passion of citizens expressing their values from which
environmental groups today appear to have disconnected.
Changing the energy economy and slowing climate change must come from the people. There is abundant evidence that it will not come from corporations and non-profits heavily invested in existing practices—nor will it come from governments and politicians, and regulators heavily compromised and committed to the existing order. It will likely be left to the people to reinvent the electricity system largely through bottom up community initiatives and disruptive technologies—motivated by the desire for a clean energy future, control of energy costs, economic growth, and local control of environmental health.12
Therein may be found many possibilities for a renewed role for environmental organizations, if they can get back to the people. EDF and NRDC can begin by listening more closely to their critics at the local level and by better understanding the technologies they are promoting—and then by re-considering their energy policy recommendations and cleaning up their conflicts of interest. Otherwise, opportunities to have a positive impact will continue to pass them by.
Edward (2014). “Value and Cost
of Distributed Generation; (including Net Metering); Comments of the
Electric Institute,” Docket No. E-00000J-14-0023 Before the Arizona
Commission, February 14.
John (2007). “Salvation (and
profit) in greentech.” TED2007
Monterey, CA. March. Filmed
March 2007 at TED2007
Social Cost of Carbon,
United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 26 November.
Greene, Nathanael (2014). “Attacks on Solar Should Be rejected. Period,” Switchboard NRDC Staff Blog, February 11. <http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ngreene/attacks_on_solar_should_be_rej.html>
Alexis (2011). Powering
the Dream: The History
and Promise of Green Technology.
Philadelphia: Da Capo Press/Pegasis Books.
Kimberly (2013). “Nearly
Sideswiped by Another Green Car.” The
Wall Street Journal [Op
Ed]. April 26, p. A17
Bill (2013). “Arizona Imposes
Net Metering Fee on Rooftop Solar,” IEEE
1 The Wall Street Journal could have framed the debate more broadly and with less bias by not focusing it only on the electromagnetic radiation issue.
Timothy Schoechle, Ph.D. is Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for Science, Law and Public Policy in Washington, D.C. He authored the landmark white paper, “Getting Smarter About the Smart Grid”, which critiqued the present approach to the smart grid and described what a truly smart electricity grid would look like, one that is capable of integrating “distributed” power generation from renewable and sustainable energy sources without the privacy, security, cost, reliability, radiation, or potential public health impacts of the present approach. Dr. Schoechle has been engaged in engineering development of electric utility gateways and energy management systems for over 25 years. He is an expert on the international standards system and serves as secretariat of ISO/IEC SC32 Data Management and Interchange, and Secretary of ISO/IEC SC25 Working Group 1, the international standards committee for Home Electronic Systems. Dr. Schoechle is a founder of BI Incorporated, pioneer developer of RFID technology, and former faculty member of the University of Colorado College of Engineering and Applied Science. He holds an M.S. in telecommunications engineering and a Ph.D. in communications policy from the University of Colorado.
The National Institute for Science, Law & Public Policy provided support for this paper.